Se encuentra disponible de forma online, el artículo: DEFINITION AND DEMONSTRATION IN ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS II 1-7 de Fabián Mié.
El mismo fue publicado en la REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE ANCIENNE, ΧLII (1), 2024, pp. 111-155.
ABSTRACT
Divisional definition is sometimes considered a key element in Aristotelian science since it seems to provide an account of species (or specific subjects), which could feature as a main principle of demonstration (Posterior Analytics II 13, 96b21-28; II 17, 99a22-23). Now, Aristotle must make clear which is actually the procedure to know species, since it cannot be demonstration. This is addressed in a preliminary, dialectical way in the rather neglected chapters II 3-7, which will be the focus of this paper. Against the common view, which sees these chapters as a
rather confusing picture of the relationship between definition and demonstration – to be corrected (and for the most part discarded) from II 8 on –, I will argue that (i) these chapters manage to lay the foundations for distinguishing the logical procedure of division from deduction and demonstration (II 3-4); that (ii) II 5-6 (and 8) state that divisional definitions are not reached by deduction nor (unlike that of per se attributes) by demonstration; and finally that (iii) II 7 shows that division is necessary to know the existence (not just the essence) of specific subjects. All this proves to be a crucial prerequisite for Aristotle’s more positive theses (to be considered here in prospect only) about different kinds of definition (in II 8-10) and about division as the method for grasping explanatorily basic essential features (in II 13-18).
Link a la revista: https://shs.cairn.info/revue-de-philosophie-ancienne?lang=fr
